Discuss and evaluate the goals, strategies and expressed rationale for U.S. commitment of large numbers of troops and massive bombing campaigns between 1964 and 1968. 2. How did
North Vietnam and South Vietnam respond to the U.S. military presence? 3. Explain the significance of the 1968 TET Offensive and the controversies surrounding it.
Critique
Tutor Comments and Recommendations:
Good work. Your thesis gave direction, your outline provided structure and your essay went directly to the heart of the matter.
Let me point to one issue that might have been addressed more analytically: "attrition" as a military strategy. Two types of questions arise. Was attrition necessary? or possible? If so, was massive U.S. troop involvement and bombing necessary? Let's begin with the latter because that is the essential question in the essay for this assignment.
Attrition is the wearing down of the opponent, in military terms, the killing of so many soldiers (and civilians) that the will to fight is lost. This is somewhat different than outright defeat where the opponent is forced, perhaps at the point of a gun, to surrender. Was bombing necessary for a successful attrition strategy? Was large troop strength necessary? Were both necessary? Was there any other option, like a blockade? If the answer is that troops and bombing were both the necessary
and sufficient conditions for a successful attrition strategy, we still need to explain attrition, as a strategy.
Was attrition the only military strategy that might have worked? Why not invasion of Hanoi and capture of the city and the North's leaders? If attrition was the only possible successful
strategy, would it have really worked? What made the U.S. military and political leaders think that the United States had more willpower to fight a war in a far-off place in the world than did the people who lived there?
Perhaps, under the circumstances, no military solution was viable. Why could they not figure this out? Might there have been another political strategy, as opposed to military strategy?
Student Critique: Do you see the one weak link in your argument? You have clearly identified attrition as a crucial element of the answer to the question in assignment 2, but you did not fully explore its implications. Your discussion of Tet 1964 is good; right on the mark.
Summary: Comprehensive knowledge is demonstrated and a good thesis and outline were prepared. The only criticism I have is that you did not see the full potential of your own outline and develop it to its potential.
Paper, Including Preliminary Thesis Statement and Outline
Thesis:
Throughout the Cold War, global containment of Communism was central to U.S. foreign policy. Since Vietnam was according to theory the leading domino, it was necessary for the United States to prop the anticommunist government of South Vietnam. By 1963-1964, internal conditions had deteriorated to the point that South Vietnam was threatened with total collapse. Having no other feasible alternative, U.S. leaders chose to increase the American military presence in Vietnam in order to deter the Communists from interfering in South Vietnam. Attrition became the official military strategy with each new Communist threat being met with ever greater escalation and use of American
military force. Thus the war passed from the stage of intervention to one of Americanization. Not until after the 1968 TET Offensive did the next stage occur--Vietnamization followed by the eventual withdrawal of U.S. troops.
Outline:
I. Rationale for staying in South Vietnam [containment, dominoes, credibility, fear of recurrence of McCartyism, World War III].
II. U.S. policy goals in South Vietnam-- prevent the enemy from infiltrating South Vietnam so that a stable viable government in South Vietnam could emerge and take hold.
III. U.S. strategy to accomplish goals--conduct a war of attrition in order to force North Vietnam to the conference table, but LIMIT military actions in order not to inadvertently and seriously provoke China or the Soviet Union and thereby start World War III.
IV. The reaction of North Vietnam to the escalation of U.S. military forces in Vietnam was counter-escalation [increased infiltration and supplies to the South] and increased support of Ho Chi Minh by the North Vietnamese.
V. The effects of the U.S. military on South Vietnam Americanization of the war.
A. The ARVN became increasingly dependent on the U.S. military to fight its battles.
B. The flood of U.S. goods and money seriously disrupted the local economy.
C. Military tactics caused many civilian casualties and created an enormous refugee population.
VI. The significance of the TET Offensive and the controversies surrounding it.
A. TET was the turning point in the war.
B. Different perceptions led to disagreement concerning which side won and which side lost--tactically and/or strategically.
C. TET greatly affected public opinion and forced U.S. officials to reexamine and reevalulate foreign policy goals in South Vietnam.
Essay:
The containment of communism was central to the establishment of a new world economic order in which capitalism would be `king'. As the Cold War intensified, so did pressure to keep the `dominoes' from falling. Since Vietnam was the leading domino, it became imperative for U.S. officials to continue and, if need be, escalate its support of South Vietnam. It was also necessary for the U.S. to `keep its word' and continue its commitments to South Vietnam in order to maintain its credibility internationally. If South Vietnam fell to the communists, according to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, "Our guarantees with regard to Berlin would lose their credibility...[It was part] of the same struggle" (qtd. in Olson 111). President Johnson firmly believed that retreat from Vietnam would be misconstrued as a weakening of American national resolve to fight Communism, and would thus encourage the communists to launch more `wars of national liberation'. He felt that this "would open the path to World War III" (qtd. in McMahon 219). Johnson, ever mindful of McCarthyism, also feared a reaction from the far-right which would not only doom the passage of his "Great Society" legislation, but could also seriously affect political freedom in America (McMahon 235).
Following the Diem and Kennedy assassinations, internal conditions within South Vietnam had deteriorated to the point that Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara warned that unless something was done soon, the entire area would probably fall under communist rule (McMahon 207). Not only was Saigon experiencing political turmoil, but a majority of villagers were increasingly being lured to side with the Viet Cong, who had made efforts to identify with the villagers and their problems.
A device was needed to enable the Johnson Administration to effectively deal with these crises. NSAM 288, formulated in March 1964, supplied it and "initiated the program of `Graduated Overt Military Pressure' against North Vietnam...[explaining that]...assistance should be able to take the form not only of economic and social measures but also police and military help to root out and control insurgent elements" (qtd. in McMahon 208). Thus, the U.S. commitment to South Vietnam was
significantly increased. It was hoped that by escalating the use of U.S. military force, Communist interference would be eliminated. The U.S. military would form a shield behind which a stable viable government could thus evolve and take root in South Vietnam. A direct result of NSAM 288 was Operation Plan 34Asecret operations in which the Maddox and Turner Joy took part. In August 1964, the Senate overwhelmingly [two dissenting votes] passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution after it
had been reported that the U.S. destroyers had been fired upon [the attacks had been `unprovoked', claimed Johnson and McNamara]. Johnson interpreted the Resolution as carte blanche
to do whatever was necessary to combat Communist aggression (Guide 47). U.S. acts of retaliation on North Vietnam did not occur till well after the 1964 presidential elections were over. Johnson did not want to `rock the boat'. He thus disregarded advice recommending reprisals when the U.S. air base
near Bien Hoa had been attacked in early November 1964. After the Special Forces camp at Pleiku had been attacked in February 1965 however, Johnson did give the green light to the bombing of selected targets in North Vietnam. The sustained bombing--Operation Rolling Thunder-- lasted off and on until the end of 1968 (Olson 126).
Once begun, escalation continued at an everquickening pace in response to increasing acts of Communist aggression and the rapid expansion of Viet Cong territory in the South. A strategy of attrition was adopted. Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Maxwell Taylor, newly appointed by LBJ to head the embassy in South Vietnam, firmly believed that U.S. policy goals could be attained by making the war too expensive for North Vietnam to continue, and so bloody that the Viet Cong could not
replace their casualties (Olson 113). However, U.S. hands were tied in the use of force lest World War III--nuclear war--be inadvertently started. Both the Soviet Union and China [had by 1964 developed nuclear warfare capability] did not want a global conflagration and had thus given just enough support to maintain North Vietnam in its fight against the noncommunists, increasing aid when it seemed necessary. Accordingly, Johnson followed the advice of Dean Rusk who argued that the US,"should deny to Hanoi success in South Vietnam without taking action on our side which
would force the other side [China, Soviet Union] to move to higher levels of conflict" (qtd. in Olson 139). Thus, a limited course of military action was pursued with constraints placed on U.S. bombing missions in order not to accidently hit a Russian ship or Chinese border town (Guide 45). In a speech given April 7, 1965 LBJ said that, "We will do everything necessary to reach that objective [independece of South Vietnam and its freedom from attack] and we will do only what is absolutely necessary" (qtd. in McMahon 211). Otherwise, LBJ was fighting "not to win, but only not to lose" (Guide 43).
Instead of forcing Hanoi to reconsider its objectives, however, the U.S. bombing raids on North Vietnam--part of the overall strategy of attrition-served only to strengthen the North Vietnamese resolve to oust the American foreigners from Vietnam, and to augment Soviet and Chinese aid to North Vietnam. The North Vietnamese now more than ever were willing to sacrifice and give their all in support of Ho Chi Minh's aims. In order for the U.S. strategy of attrition to work, the U.S.military would have to annually kill at least 250,000-300,000 Communists. This, the number of new military recruits Ho Chi Minh estimated he could get per year, he was willing to sacrifice to reunify Vietnam (Olson 145). Whereas the conflict was a limited one for U.S. policymakers, for Ho Chi Minh, "it was total war, the culmination of centuries of struggle, a cause to die for, a cause worthy of risking complete annihilation" (Olson 127). Ho Chi Minh was convinced that by waging his own war of political attrition, he could undermine American support for the war. When the costs became too high, either in money or American casualties, he felt certain that the U.S. would withdraw. Ho Chi Minh could afford to wait. He had time on his side. "Don't worry," he had reassured his generals. "I've been
to America. I know Americans. They are an impatient people. They will leave" (qtd. in Olson 145).
Movement down the Ho Chi Minh Trail, which included regular North Vietnamese troops and Soviet and Chinese weapons and supplies, dramatically increased. Viet Cong acts of aggression
and terrorism intensified. Using guerrilla tactics, the Communists fought on their own terms to disappear into the jungles, underground tunnel mazes, and South Vietnamese village sanctuaries.
Escalation was met with further counter-escalation. U.S. bombers increased their runs to North Vietnam and also struck the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos. The number of U.S. ground troops continued to climb as the waging of war intensified, devastating South Vietnam. However, the use of military tactics such as "search and destroy" and "freefire" zones that killed civilians as well as enemy troops, together with the implementation of pacification programs that forcibly removed the peasants from
their ancestral lands, and the extensive use of defoliants that `killed' their beloved `Mother Earth', served to alienate the population rather than win their hearts and minds. The chaos displaced an estimated four million peasants (Olson 163). Having no alternative, the refugees fled to overcrowded cities which could not absorb them because of the enormous strains already being imposed on urban resources by the expanding war economy.
The Americanization of the war was debilitating on the South Vietnamese military and economy. The South Vietnamese Republican Army [ARVN] became increasingly dependent on the U.S.
military to fight its battles and experienced "a deepening of a native inferiority complex because of American-based training and the growing American cynicism toward its allies" (Guide 56). It had also become very lucrative for them to engage in `operations' other than military.
The billions of U.S. dollars being pumped into the wartime economy together with the large influx of American goods transformed the local economy into one which now became geared solely to providing services for American servicemen [more than 2 million would through South Vietnam, according to Kolko (McMahon 401)]. Not only were native industries diverted or destroyed, but the large amount of money to be made `on the Americans' encouraged corruption and blackmarketeering, often by government and ARVN officials, with products also ending up in Communists' hands.
Thus in lieu of developing economic and social stability necessary for her survival if she were to remain independent, South Vietnam became a house of cards propped solely by U.S. dollars. Also, in its present condition, her badly-flawed and weakened ARVN could not hope to defend her if the Americans were to suddenly pull out. Only the huge American presence temporarily prevented the Communists from victory.
Meanwhile in America, serious disagreements concerning military strategy and U.S. policy goals had erupted within the Washington bureaucracy. Secretary of Defense McNamara reversed his position and urged the President to pursue negotiations as "the only way out" (Guide 57). However, President Johnson and Gen. Westmoreland continued to reassure the American people that the U.S. was winning the war. Although the anti-war movement was gaining strength, many Americans believed their leaders. For them, the illusion that all was well, that a light could be seen at the end of the tunnel as they were so often told, would soon be shattered.
For TET 1968, a bilateral cease-fire had been declared so that families could be together to celebrate this most important of holidays--the Vietnamese Lunar New Year. Thus many ARVN soldiers went home to honor the shrines of their ancestors. The Communists, however, broke the truce launching a surprise general attack throughout South Vietnam. They struck 36 of the 44 provincial capitals, 5 of the 6 major cities, 64 district capitals, and 50 hamlets in addition to the U.S. Embassy, Tan Son Nhut air base, the presidential palace, and the South Vietnamese general staff headquarters (Olson 183). [The
dimensions of this sneak attack are mind-boggling!] The U.S. military and ARVN were caught completely off guard. Intelligence reports had been seriously misinterpreted by the high command.
Nevertheless, the Communists were quickly defeated except in Hue City which took 3 weeks.
TET was the turning point in the war. Different perceptions led to disagreement concerning which side won or lost, tactically and/or strategically. Comparing the number of military casualties-- 1100 American and 2300 ARVN to as many as 40,000 Viet Cong, clearly shows that the Communists suffered a massive military, tactical defeat (Olson 186). But adding the civilian toll-- up to 45,000 dead or wounded and more than 1 million made homeless, in my opinion, places a different perspective on the outcome. TET did, however, become a political, strategic victory for the Communists because of its
tremendous impact on an already divisive American public opinion.
TET brought the war home to the American people. On viewing the events being broadcast, many citizens came to the conclusion that they had been lied to by their government. They could not
reconcile the inconsistencies in what they had been told with what they were actually seeing on T.V.--the U.S. Embassy being attacked and the enemy being everywhere at once! This to them was not the sign of a weakened enemy. People also questioned why Westmoreland, as reported by the press, needed another 206,000 troops if the U.S. had won such an overwhelming victory!
Hanoi's strategy worked. Public opinion in the U.S. had been undermined. The Johnson Administration was thus forced to reexamine and to reevaluate U.S. policy in South Vietnam. The U.S. would soon enter its next stage in the Vietnam conflict ,"Vietnamization", to be followed by the eventual withdrawal of U.S. troops.
Works Cited:
Course Guide Vietnam: An Interdisciplinary Perspective McMahon, Robert J. Major Problems in the History of the Vietnam War
Olson, James S., Randy Roberts. Where the Domino Fell America and Vietnam, 1945-1990.
